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Miller: Touche Ross v. Redington

FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
Private Cause of Action Under Section 17(a) of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 e Doctrine of Implication
Touche Ross v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979)

T

HE

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT of 1934 is principally designed to pro-

tect investors through regulation of securities transactions on the organized exchanges and in the over-the-counter markets., In addition to the
creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission as its leading enforcement mechanism,' the 1934 Act provides for criminal penalties' and, in
certain instances, private causes of action for individuals who incur damage
by others' violations of the Act.' However, courts will often imply a civil
cause of action for an injured party despite the absence of express statutory
authorization.3 Subsequent judicial attempts to determine when supplemental
civil relief can or should be implied has traditionally resulted in the courts'
inability to formulate consistent and workable analytical standards of implication. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has indicated an attempt
to reappraise its position and adhere to an arguably stricter standard for
the judicial implication of private causes of action. Touche Ross v. Redington' represents the most current example of the willingness of the Court
to maintain this standard.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Touche Ross & Co. (Touche Ross) is a firm of certified public accountants. Weis Securities, Inc. (Weis) was a broker-dealer registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as well as a member of
the New York Stock Exchange. Weis retained Touche Ross to audit its
books and records and prepare for filing with the SEC the annual reports
of financial condition required by Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.!
1 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a - 78kk (1976)).
2 Id. at §§ 4, 9, 21; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d, 78i, 78s, 78u (1976).
81d. at § 32(a); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(a) (1976).
41d. at §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18(a), 20(a); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78p(b), 78r(a), 78t(a) (1976).
5 See Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 Hv.
L. REv.

285 (1963).
6 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979).

7 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1976).
follows:

In 1972, the date relevant to this case, Section 17(a) read as

(a) Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, every broker or
dealer who transacts a business in securities through the medium of any such member,
every registered securities association, and every broker or dealer registered pursuant
to section 78o of this title, shall make, keep, and preserve for such periods, such
accounts, correspondance, memoranda, papers, books, and other records, and make such
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Subsequently, Weis' financial condition began to deteriorate and, pur8
suant to the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) Weis' liquidation
was ordered and Redington was appointed trustee. 9 During this period, the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) advanced $14 million
to Trustee Redington to satisfy the claims of approximately 34,000 Weis
customers who had left assets with Weis. Suit was subsequently filed on
April 30, 1976 in district court by Trustee Redington and SIPC against
Touche Ross." The complaint alleged that in 1972 certain of Weis' officers
misstated the financial condition of Weis in reports prepared at the end of
the fiscal year. These actions resulted in the preparation and certification
of allegedly false and misleading financial statements by Touche Ross in
violation of Section 17(a) of the 1934 Act." Consequently, plaintiffs alleged
that Touche Ross breached duties it had assumed toward them by violating,
and aiding and abetting the Weis officers in violating, state common law,
Section 17(a) of the 1934 Act and certain regulations promulgated thereunder by the SEC.
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that no claim
for relief was stated because no private cause of action could be implied from
Section 17(a). Acknowledging the fact that in the 45 years during which
the statute has been in effect there has been no decision by the Supreme Court
as to whether a private right of action could be asserted for a violation of
Section 17(a), the district court viewed this section as essentially a bookkeeping provision:
From the wording of this provision and in the context of the other
provisions of the 1934 Act, it would appear that Section 17 was designed
reports, as the Commission by its rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary

or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. Such accounts,
correspondance, memoranda, papers, books, and other records shall be subject at

anytime or from time to time to such reasonable periodic, special, or other examinations

by examiners or other representatives of the Commission as the Commission may deem
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Section 17 was amended in 1975. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970) with 15
U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1) (1976).
securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa - 78111 (1976)). Generally, SIPA was enacted to provide to
customers of securities broker-dealers protection against losses which might occur as a
result of the financial failure of broker dealers.
9 Securities Investor Protection Corporation is a non-profit organization of securities dealers
established by Congress in 1970 in the Securities Investor Protection Act. 15 U.S.C. §
78ccc (1976). SIPC is required to maintain a fund, supported by private assessments of
its members, to be used to compensate those customers of brokerage houses who incur
damages due to broker insolvencies. Id. § 78ddd, § 78fff(f).
10 Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 428 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
"1In four opinion letters, all written in 1972, Touche Ross represented that it had examined
certain financial statements of Weis and concluded that they fairly and accurately presented
the financial status of Weis, in conformity with generally accepted accounting standards.
425 U.S. 185, 194
12The Supreme Court, in the case of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
n. 13 (1976), had expressly left this question open.
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to supply administrative guidance in the bookkeeping area and not to
create any rights in anybody."8
The district court went on to state that Section 18(a) should be considered the only civil liability provision for a violation of the "reporting
provisions"1 of the 1934 Act. 5 As a result, the Court did not accept the
argument set forth by Trustee Redington and SIPC that there was an
implied private claim under Section 17 broader than the claim expressly created in Section 18.1" Hence, the district court concluded that the subject
matter of the two sections (Section 17 and Section 18), their titles, and
their juxtaposition "strongly suggest a legislative intent that the only private
claim for a violation of Section 17 was the claim created in Section 18""
(emphasis added).
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and held that SIPC and Trustee
Redington could assert an implied cause of action on behalf of Weis' customers.'" In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court rejected the stance
taken by the district court that Section 17 was a mere reporting provision:
We believe that, even if no right of action were implied, to see nothing
but 'administrative guidance' in a provision as crucial to the regulation of brokers as section 17 is to take far too narrow a view of the
statute. Certified public accountants play a significant role in the scheme
23 428 F. Supp. at 489.
14 Specifically, reporting provisions are those sections of the 1934 Act
that require the filing
of applications, documents, and reports. In addition to Section 17, other reporting sections
include §§ 12(b), 12(g), 13(a), 13(d), 13(f), 15(b)(1), 15(d), and 16(a); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 781(b), 781(g), 78m(a), 78m(d), 78m(f), 78o(b)(1), 78o(d), 78p(a) (1976). The
majority of courts dealing with reporting provisions have held that Section 18(a) is the
"catch-all" civil liability provision. See e.g., DeWitt v. American Stock Transfer
Co., 433
F. Supp. 994, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Penn Central Securities Litigation, 347 F. Supp.
1327, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974).
15 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). Section 18(a) provides:
Liability for misleading statements
(a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided in subsection
(d) of section 78o of this title, which statement was at the time and in the light
of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect to
any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was
false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or
sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement, for damages caused
by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and
had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading. A person seeking to
enforce such liability may sue at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction. In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for
the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, against either party litigant (emphasis added).
16 Trustee Redington and SIPC could not bring suit under Section 18 since neither they nor
Weis' customers had bought or sold a security in reliance on the reports submitted by
Touche Ross.
17 428 F. Supp. at 489.
is Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617 (2nd Cir. 1978).
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created by the '34 Act for the regulations promulgated by the SEC
. . . we hold that section 17 of the '34 Act likewise imposes a duty
on accountants."9
Thus, the appellate court rejected the conclusion of the district court that
Section 18(a) was to be the exclusive civil liability provision for a violation
of Section 17. Rather, the appellate court held that the customers of brokers
were the "favored wards" of Section 17(a) and, therefore, it could not
agree that "Congress simultaneously sought to protect a class and deprived
the class of the means of protection" (by limiting Section 18 (a) to purchasers
and sellers and not expressly providing a remedy for the customers of brokers in Section 17 (a)."0
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to decide whether
customers of securities brokerage firms that are required to file certain
financial reports as mandated by Section 17 have an implied cause of action
for damages under Section 17(a) against accountants who audit such
reports based on misstatements contained in the reports.
The Court reversed, holding that a private remedy is not implicit in
Section 17(a).
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLICATION
The doctrine of implication was first accepted and applied by American
2
Courts in 1916.21 Generally speaking, except for a brief period, the doctrine has witnessed prevailing acceptance. This was especially true during
the 1960's and early 1970's as courts began to formulate more extensive, but
19

id. at 621.

2Id. at 623.
21 The first case to enunciate the implication doctrine was Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). In Rigsby, a railroad employee was injured by defective
railroad equipment in violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43
(1975). The Court ultimately held that, despite the fact that the relevant statutory provision
did not provide a private cause of action, the plaintiff was undoubtedly a member of the
class the statute was designed to protect:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in
damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right
to recover the damages from the party in default is implied.
Id. at 39.
The principal announced in the Rigsby decision was, in effect, too broad. It did not
provide an analytical set of standards which a court could apply to a statute in an attempt
to find a civil remedy. Rather, it has been argued by some commentators that the rule might
well be applicable to anyone who is injured by a violation of a federal statutory provision
since most federal regulatory statutes are written with the intent to protect and benefit
some group of individuals. See e.g., Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak
and Ash: Some Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392, 1394 (1975); Note,
Emerging Standard for Implied Action Under Federal Statutes, 9 U. MicH. J.L REFORM
294, 297 (1976); Note, Implication of Private Actions from Federal Statutes: From Borak
To Ash, 1 J. CoRP. L. 371, 376 (1976).
22See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1963); T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States,
359 U.S. 464, 471 (1959); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457
(1957).
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not necessarily consistent, rationales for the implication of civil remedies.
However, Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington reflects the culmination of a
series of decisions promulgated by the present Court which, in attempting
to provide a more analytical framework in deciding whether to imply a private cause of action, has resulted in a stricter standard.
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad
Passengers (Amtrak)23 was the first decision which signalled a change in the
attitude of the Court toward implication. In Amtrak, the plaintiff brought
suit to enjoin the discontinuance of certain passenger rail routes, claiming
that such action would violate the Rail Passenger Act of 1970." Because
the legislative history of the Act expressly created a public cause of action
by the Attorney General and a private cause of action in cases involving a
labor agreement, the Court denied relief by applying the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.5 The Court interpreted this tenet to mean that
when the express language and history of a statute provide exclusive remedies for its violation, no additional private rights may be implied absent "clear
contrary evidence of legislative intent."2
Amtrak formed a basis of analysis that was adopted and applied in
the Redington decision: that the initial determination by a court should
be whether Congress expressly provided a remedy for violations of a
statutory provision and if so, absent clear contrary evidence of legislative
intent, the express remedy will be deemed exclusive and no other form
of relief may be implied.
Initially, the Redington Court followed the principles set out in Amtrak.27 Its central inquiry was focused on whether Congress intended to
23414 U.S. 453 (1974) (Amtrak).
24 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
25 "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DicrONtRY 692 (rev.
4th ed. 1968). This doctrine has been met with much criticism. The most common argument
made against application of this maxim is that it arguably does not reveal actual legislative
intent since it falsely assumes that Congress has examined each statutory provision and has
consciously determined to withhold a private action. See SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320
U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943). See also Gamin & Eisberg, The Implied Rights Doctrine, 41 U.
Mo. K.C.L. REv. 292, 300-01 (1972); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, supra note 5, at 290-91; Note, Implications of Private Actions from Federal
Statutes: From Borak To Ash, supra note 21, at 377-78; Comment, Implying Private Causes
of Action From Federal Statutes: Amtrak and Cort Apply the Brakes, 17 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L REv. 53, 68 (1975).
26 414 U.S. at 457. In further explanation, the Court stated that:
(I)t goes without saying . . .that the inference of such a private cause of action not
otherwise authorized by the statute must be consistent with the evident legislative intent
and, of course, with the effectuation of the purposes intended to be served by the Act.
Id. at 457-58.
27 These principles were reaffirmed in Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour (SIPC),
421 U.S. 412 (1975). In SIPC, customers of a failing brokerage-dealer sought a court
order to compel the SIPC to initiate liquidation proceedings against the dealer. The Court,
in refusing to imply a private remedy for the plaintiffs, held that Congress had manifestly
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create a private cause of action in Section 17(a). To this extent, the
Redington Court closely scrutinized both the language and the legislative
history of the statute.2 8 In terms of the language of Section 17 (a) the majority
concluded, as did the district court, that this section was merely a "reporting
provision" and did not purport to create a private cause of action." Regarding legislative history, the Court was unable to find any evidence of
Congressional intent to either create or deny a private cause of action in
Section 17(a). 30 However, against the arguments of SIPC and Trustee
Redington, the Court refused to imply a remedy on the basis of Congressional silence"' stating that:
(W)here, as here, the plain language of the provision weighs against
implication of a private remedy, the fact that there is no suggestion
whatsoever in the legislative history that Section 17(a) may give rise
to suits for damages reinforces our decision not to find such a right of
8
action implicit within the section.
Apparently content that Congress did not intend, either expressly or impliedly, to provide a remedy in Section 17(a), the Court emphasized the
existence of other remedial provisions as evidence of legislative intent not
intended that only the SEC have statutory authority to compel the SIPC to discharge its
obligations. The Court stated that:
Congress' primary purpose in enacting the SIPA and creating the SIPC was, of course,
the protection of investors. It does not follow, however, that an implied right of action
by investors who deem themselves to be in need of the Act's protection, is either
necessary to or indeed capable of furthering that purpose.
Id. at 421.
Note, however, that the statutory provisions in both Amtrak and SIPC involve explicitly conferred remedies for a specific wrongdoing and that the plaintiffs in each case
are seeking additional remedies. In Redington there was no express remedy in Section 17(a),
but Trustee Redington and SIPC argued that relief should be implied in this section. On the
other hand, Touche Ross maintained that Section 18(a) should provide the exclusive remedy.
Green,
28A series of recent decisions also reflect this approach. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) (The language of Section 10(b) gives no indication that Congress
meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception. Nor have we been
cited to any evidence in the legislative history that would support a departure from the
language of the statute); Ernst & Ernst v. Hoclfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (When a
statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipulation and deception .. . and when its
history reflects no more expansive intent, (the Court is) quite unwilling to extend the
scope of the statute).
29 By its terms, 317(a) is forward-looking, not retrospective; it seeks to forestall insolvency,
not to provide recompense after it has occurred. 99 S. Ct. at 2486.
so Id. at 2486-87.
- Two divergent views have normally been presented as to whether a silent legislative record
should be used to either grant or deny implication: that silence conclusively indicates private
actions were not intended or, at the other extreme, that silence should not preclude implication given that a legislature has merely failed to consider the issue at hand. Commentators appear to accept the latter view. A common argument generally given in support of
this position is that the legislature could not have been expected to contemplate the various
enforcement mechanisms at the time of passage which would ensure the vigor of the act.
See Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications for Implication, supra note 21, at 1413-14. Note, Implication of Private Actions from Federal
supra note 21, at 378-79.
Statutes: From Borak To Ash,(1979).
2486-87
8299 S. Ct. at 2479,
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to provide a remedy. First, it concluded that since Congress expressly
granted private causes of action in numerous provisions of the 1934 Act
it could have, if it chose, expressly provided for a private damage remedy
in Section 17(a).13 Second, the Court maintained that there was evidence to
support the view that Congress meant Section 18(a) to be the exclusive
remedy for misstatements contained in the "reporting provisions."'"
The Redington Court did not expressly adopt the expressio unius doctrine set out in Amtrak. However, it deemed Congressional enactment of
Section 18(a) to be concrete evidence of a legislative intent to preclude the
acceptance of a broader implied remedy under Section 17(a) to include
brokerage customers.
A similar position was taken by the Court in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores"3 where the plaintiffs alleged that, due to a scheme
devised by the defendants which presented an overly pessimistic appraisal
of a new business, they refrained from purchasing securities. Relief was
sought under Section 10(b) which makes it unlawful to use deceptive
devices or make misleading statements "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security."'" The Court ruled that a private action for dam,ages under rule 10(b) was restricted to actual purchasers or sellers of
securities not those, such as the plaintiffs, who merely refrained from purchasing securities. The Court noted that when Congress has chosen to provide
a remedy for those other than purchasers or sellers it has done so expressly. 7
However, reliance by the Redington Court on examination of mere
statutory language and legislative history was incompatible with prior cases
where the Court was willing to examine other factors of analysis to determine whether an implied private right of action was proper.38
Mr. Justice Marshall, the sole dissenter in Redington, argued that the
majority approach was contrary to the test established in Cort v. Ash. 9
83

See supra note 4.

s3 99 S. Ct. at 2488, n. 15.

35 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
3
6See Rule 10b-5; 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5; 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1975).
37421 U.S. at 734 (citing 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b) (1975) which expressly allows issuers of a security to recover profits). See also Note, Redington v. Touche
Ross & Co.: An UnwarrantedImplication of a Private Right of Action Against Accountants
Under Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 73 NORTHWESTERN UNIv. L.
REv. 1136 (1979).
" See e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1953 (1979); Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus. Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 38-42 (1977); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 577
(1969); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202-04 (1967); J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964). Note, however, that the Redington Court, in
dicta, maintained that other factors may well be relevant in a case presenting a factual situation which demands that attention be drawn to additional considerations. 99 S. Ct. at 2489.
a9 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, the Supreme Court held that a corporation stockholder did
not have an implied cause of action against corporate directors under 18 U.S.C. § 610
(1970), a criminal statute prohibiting a corporation from making certain campaign con-

tributions.
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In Cort, the Supreme Court developed a four factor analysis for determining whether a remedy is implicit in a statute which does not expressly
grant one:
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted' - that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third,
is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme
to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally is the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause
"
of action based solely on federal law?
The Redington majority maintained, however, that it was needless
to adhere to a mechanical application of all four factors. Instead, once the
statutory language and legislative history - traditional criteria used in
ascertaining legislative intent - have been clearly determined, it will be
unnecessary to consider the latter two factors set out in Cort, whether an
implied private remedy is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the section
or whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law.
This direction appears to be clearly inconsistent with the approach
"1
followed in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. Plaintiff, a defeated takeover bidder, was denied an implied cause of action against its successful com2
petitor and the target company under Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act.'
Finding that this section made no express provision for a private cause
of action, the Court turned to the legislative history to divine the intent of
Congress. While maintaining that Congress intended to protect only the
shareholders of a target corporation, not tender offerors such as the plaintiff,
the Court did not stop its analysis there. Rather, it went on and applied
all four Cort factors, 3 finding that its conclusion was nonetheless confirmed."
This approach, from what appears to be a mechanical application of
the four Cort factors in Piper to reliance on only evidence of legislative
intent in Redington, questions how meaningful the Cort criteria have become in providing a useful analytical framework for implication.'- Granted,
41d. at 78 (citations omitted).

421430 U.S. 1 (1977).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Section 14(e) makes unlawful "any fradulent, deceptive,
or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer . . . or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer."
43 1n addition to the application of the Cort criteria, the Piper Court also based its decision
on a fifth requirement: "Whether it is necessary to imply a remedy to effectuate the congressional goals embodied in the statute." 430 U.S. at 26.
" See Recent Developments, Implied Private Right of Action Under Section 17 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 31 VANDERBILT L. REv. 1513, 1517 (1978).
4'11d. at 1517.
42
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each of the factors provide the courts with a number of useful criteria to
consider in determining whether a cause of action should be implied."
However, the recording of four separate factors may create the assumption
that all of the factors should be given equal weight and importance when,
in fact, this may not be the case especially where, as in Redington, the
finding that the legislature did not intend the plaintiff to benefit from the
statute was clearly dispositive of the case.' It may be argued that the
Redington decision reflects an attempt by the Court to develop a more refined attitude toward the Cort criteria which would, in turn, result in a more
accurate reflection of congressional intent.
However, by disregarding the examination of the latter two Cort factors
as well as other criteria, the Court seems to be limiting what it had previously
determined to be relevant considerations in ascertaining whether a private
remedy should be implied in statutory actions.
For example, the 1964 landmark decision of J.1. Case Co. v. Borak,"
while arguably representing the most extreme example of the willingness
of the Supreme Court to imply a private right of action, 9 nevertheless
presented considerations which, if accepted, might have affected the analysis
in the Redington decision.
The plaintiff in Borak, a stockholder of J.I. Case Co., brought suit
under Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act alleging that an attempted merger by
Case was effected through the circulation of a false and misleading proxy
statement." Like Section 17(a) in Redington, Section 14(a) did not ex4e See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 99 S.Ct. 1946 (1979). The Supreme Court held that
plaintiff, who was denied admission to medical schools at two private universities, was
entitled to a private cause of action under Title IX. The Court maintained that "before
concluding that Congress intended to make a remedy available to a special class of litigants,
a court must carefully analyze the four factors that Cort v. Ash identifies as indicative of
such intent" (citations omitted). Id. at 1947. But see Mr. Justice White, dissenting. He
maintains that "Because in my view the legislative history and statutory scheme show that
Congress intended not to provide a new private cause of action, and because under our
previous decisions such intent is controlling, I dissent (citing Cort, SIPC, and Amtrak)." Id.
at 1968. See also Mr. Justice Powell, dissenting. He states that "(A)s the opinion of the
Court today demonstrates, the Cort analysis too easily may be used to deflect inquiry away
from the intent of Congress, and to permit a court instead to substitute its own views
as to the desirability of private enforcement." Id. at 1980.
47 99 S.Ct. at 2486 (1979).
4 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
' 9 See e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 99 S.Ct. at 1946 (Powell, J. dissenting).
50 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). Section 14(a) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, by use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interestate commerce or of any facility of any national securities
exchange or otherwise to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy
or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security)
registered on any national securities exchange in contravention of such rules and regulations as the (Securities and Exchange) Commission may prescribe is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors" (emphasis added).
The Redington Court, however, did attempt to distinguish Borak on the ground that the
statute in Borak at least prohibited certain conduct of private parties while Section 17(a)
does not refer to the conduct of any individuals. 99 S.Ct. at 2485-86 (1979).
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pressly provide a remedy. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that an
51
implied right of action existed under this section. It premised its decision
2
on consideration of Section 27 of the 1934 Act which gives the federal
courts jurisdiction over "all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
5
enforce any liability or duty created" under the Act." In addition, the Court
looked at the "broad remedial purposes" of the 1934 Act and concluded
that while the language of Section 14(a) made no specific reference to a
private right of action, "among its chief purposes is the 'protection of
investors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where
"
necessary to achieve that result."' In further justification, the Court held
that because the SEC was not able to adequately enforce Section 14(a)
violations, an implied private action would be "a necessary supplement to
Commission action." 55
The Redington Court, however, held that these considerations were
not only inapplicable but, rather, irrelevant to the case at bar. It claimed
that a cause of action could not be inferred from Section 27:
Section 27 grants jurisdiction to the federal courts and provides for
venue and service of process. It creates no cause of action of its own
force and effect; it imposes no liabilities. The source of plaintiff's rights
must be found, if at all, in the substantive provisions of the 1934 Act
which they seek to enforce, not in the jurisdictional provision... The
Court in Borak found a private cause of action implicit in Section 14(a)
... We do not now question the actual holding of that case, but we
decline to read the opinion so broadly that virtually every provision of
50
the securities acts gives rise to an implied private cause of action.
In addition, the Redington Court found that, due to recent opinions which
do not permit reading a provision "more broadly than its language and
statutory scheme reasonably permit," no reliance could be placed on the
"broad remedial purposes" of the Act.5 This stance is inapposite from that
taken in Borak where the Court determined that since the purpose of the
statute was for the protection of investors, judicial relief would be necessary
51 The "Borak" test, though not explicitly set out in the Borak decision, was enunciated

in Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967). A private action
may be implied when:
1. The plaintiff is within the zone of interest intended to be protected by the statute.
2. The harm is of the type that the statute was intended to forestall and
3. The remedies provided are inadequate to effectuate Congress' purpose in passing the
statute. See Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications
for Implication, supra note 21, at 1396.
52

15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).

53

377 U.S. at 431.

5' Id. at 432. Identical language appears in Section 17(a).
55 Id.
-99 S. Ct. at 2479, 2490.
57 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978); Ernst & Ernst

v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976).
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss2/5
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to achieve Congressional intent to provide a private remedy. In essence,
the Borak Court deemed implication necessary to achieve the purpose of
the statute. 8 However, the Redington Court failed to consider whether implying a private right of action in Section 17(a) was necessary to protect
a customer of a broker. Simply stated, the Court was not willing to encompass in its analysis such considerations as those found in Borak:
To the extent our analysis in today's decision differs from that of the
Court in Borak, it suffices to say that in a series of cases since Borak
we have adhered to a stricter standard for the implication of private
causes of action, and we follow that stricter standard today. 5

III. CONCLUSION
A host of reasons have traditionally been given for implying a private
remedy in a statute not expressly providing one. For example, the court
is arguably in a better position to assess the need for additional civil relief
than was the legislature. Also, the character of regulatory statutes may make
uniform remedies more practicable." As a result, there is undoubtedly
a need for federal courts to provide remedies for the violation of federal
statutory provisions. Yet, the decision whether to imply a private cause of
action involves the resolution of a number of difficult and overlapping issues. For example, the type of conduct the statute was designed to protect,
whether it is possible to correctly discern legislative intent, what possible
policies the legislature had in mind when passing the statute, and whether
the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms of a regulatory statute should
be a crucial consideration. It is in this process whereby, as a result of
ineffective limits initially being placed on the implied right of action doctrine,
some courts have been accused of judicial legislation and violating the
separation of powers doctrine in their effort to find an implied remedy."
It was undoubtedly in response to this situation that the present Court
has attempted to articulate a more analytical approach toward private
remedies under the securities statutes. As shown by Amtrak, an initial determination must be made whether Congress, absent clear contrary evidence
of legislative intent, expressly provided a remedy. This is resolved by an
examination of considerations which most clearly evidence legislative intent:
statutory language and legislative history. The Redington Court, however,
ended its examination at this point. There was no need to analyze the latter
58 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have echoed this approach. See e.g., Sante Fe Indus.,

Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 467 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 432 U.S. 1,

26 (1977).
59 99 S. Ct. at 2490.
60 See Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, supra note 5, at
291-93.
e1 See Comment, Implying Private Causes of Action from Federal Statutes: Amtrak and
Cori Apply
the Brakes, supra note
Published
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1980 25, at 65.
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two factors set out in the Cort test as well as other considerations such as
references to the remedial purposes of the 1934 Act enunciated in Borak.
It can be argued that this approach is more reflective of actual Congressional intent. That is, another direction could have been taken where
an implied remedy might have been found on nothing more than a judicially
promulgated concept of what one court may have considered the purpose
of the Act to be, the inadequacy of the mode of enforcement, the policies
that the legislature sought to effectuate, and so on.
However, the Redington Court took a traditional stance concerning the
separation of powers and refused to engage in supererogatory conduct.
JAMES L. MILLER

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FirstAmendment • Freedom of The Press - Erosion of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979)
Herbert v. Lando1 the Supreme Court announced that the first amendment does not require a constitutional privilege foreclosing direct inquiry
into the editorial process. While the decision may seem correct in its overturning of the absolute privilege afforded to the editorial process by the
Second Circuit,' nevertheless, by refusing to grant even a qualified privilege
to the editorial process the Court may have upset the delicate balance between an individual's interest in his reputation and society's interest in
a free flow of information recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.'
N

Anthony Herbert, a retired United States Army Colonel, attracted
the attention of the news media in March 1971 when he filed charges
with the United States Army Criminal Investigation Division accusing his
superior officers of covering up war crimes in Vietnam.4 Herbert alleged
that he had witnessed numerous atrocities while serving in Vietnam and
that he had duly reported these atrocities to his superiors. According to
1441 U.S. 153 (1979).

2Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1483 (1978).
3 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
MAGAZDE. In September the New York
' In July 1971 Herbert was interviewed by Lai
Times carried an article entitled How a Supersoldier was Fired from his Command, Hirbort
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss2/5
12
also appeared on the Dick Cavett Television Show. 568 F.2d at 981.

